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WHEN, IF EVER, DOES EVIDENTIARY ERROR
CONSTITUTE REVERSIBLE ERROR?
Margaret A. Berger *
I. INTRODUCTION
When asked by the organizers of this Symposium to think about
whether evidence rules matter, I elected to translate the topic into one
considerably narrower: when, if ever, do evidence rules matter once the
trial is over and the case is on appeal? Since I was also promised that I
need not write a conventional law review article replete with state-of-the-
art footnotes, I confess at the outset that my conclusions rest on a fairly
narrow universe of 1990 appellate opinions, as well as some recent schol-
arly commentary and personal experience. I hope that others will find
some of these remarks of sufficient interest to pursue the topic further.
All of my observations relate to the federal courts and the Federal Rules
of Evidence.
For purposes of this Essay I will concentrate primarily on those
cases in which evidence rules seemingly matter the most on appeal-
cases in which the reviewing court has specified that it is reversing be-
cause of an evidentiary error at trial.1 Cases in which the court con-
cluded that the error also amounted to a constitutional violation have
been omitted because courts use a somewhat different standard in deter-
mining reversible error in these cases.
2
• Professor and Associate Dean for Long Range Planning, Brooklyn Law School; A.B.,
1953, Radcliffe College; J.D., 1956, Columbia University School of Law.
1. This list does not include habeas corpus applications from state court determinations
in which the court discussed a Federal Rule in the process of finding an evidentiary error
necessitating a granting of the writ. It also does not include cases in which the appellate court
reversed a grant of summary judgment on the ground that the district court had erroneously
concluded that evidence would not be available at trial. See, eg., In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB
Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 860 (3d Cir. 1990) (district court erroneously applied rules on expert
testimony in concluding that plaintiff would not be able to prove causation because expert
testimony was inadmissible), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 1584 (1991); DeLuca v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 957 (3d Cir. 1990) (same). This list also excludes cases in
which the appellate court remanded because it needed additional information to determine
whether reversible error had occurred.
2. In the case of constitutional error, the courts use a higher standard-the error must be
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt-and the burden is on the prosecution to show that error
did not result, rather than on the appellant to demonstrate that the error affected his or her
substantial rights. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); Kotteakos v. United
States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946). Recent Supreme Court opinions have, however, eroded some
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Although, more than twenty thousand cases a year were tried in the
federal courts in the twenty-four month period between July 1, 1988 and
June 30, 1990,3 1 could find only thirty cases decided in 1990 in which a
court of appeals stated in an officially reported opinion that its reversal
was due to an evidentiary error at trial.4 Furthermore, this number,
of the distinction between constitutional and non-constitutional error. Chapman appeared to
require courts to reverse, even if overwhelming evidence had been presented, if the erroneously
admitted or excluded evidence might have affected the verdict. Now, however, constitutional
error is nevertheless harmless as long as the reviewing court is persuaded that "the record
developed at trial establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570,
579 (1986); see also Arizona v. Fulminante, I11 S. Ct. 1246, 1264 (1991) ("[Evidence] may
therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to de-
termine whether its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."). In both constitu-
tional and non-constitutional error cases, therefore, the focus may be more on whether the
evidence against appellant is overwhelming rather than on the nature of the error. See JACK B.
WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE V 103[08] (1986 & Supp.
1991).
3. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANN. REP. OF THE DIRECTOR APP.
I, at 43 (1989) (20,102 trials completed between July 1, 1988 and June 30, 1989); ADMINIS-
TRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. CrS., ANN. REP. OF THE DIRECTOR 161 (1990) [hereinafter
1990 ANN. REP.] (20,433 trials completed between July 1, 1989 and June 30, 1990). It is
impossible to tell from these statistics how many of the verdicts in these trials were appealed
and decided in 1990. A total of 39,734 appeals were filed in all circuits in the twelve-month
period ending June 30, 1989, and a total of 40,898 appeals were filed in all circuits in the
twelve-month period ending June 30, 1990. See 1990 ANN. REP., supra, at 105. One cannot
tell from these statistics how many appeals followed trials, but included in the second period's
totals are 2263 prisoner petitions, 1087 bankruptcies and 2578 administrative appeals which
clearly did not entail appeals after a trial in the district court.
4. D.C. Circuit: United States v. Miller, 904 F.2d 65, 67-68 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Ealy v.
Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 897 F.2d 1159, 1160 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 370 (1990).
Second Circuit: United States v. Long, 917 F.2d 691, 704-05 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v.
Colombo, 909 F.2d 711, 715 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662, 692 (2d Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1102 (1991). Third Circuit: Habecker v. Copperloy Corp., 893
F.2d 49, 53 (3d Cir. 1990). Fourth Circuit: United States v. Bolick, 917 F.2d 135, 140 (4th
Cir. 1990); United States v. Simpson, 910 F.2d 154, 158 (4th Cir. 1990). Fifth Circuit: Dartez
v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 910 F.2d 1291, 1294 (5th Cir. 1990); Edmonds v. Illinois Cent. Gulf
R.R., 910 F.2d 1284, 1288 (5th Cir. 1990); Davidson Oil Country Supply Co. v. Klockner,
Inc., 908 F.2d 1238, 1249 (5th Cir. 1990). Sixth Circuit: Laney v. Celotex Corp., 901 F.2d
1319, 1321 (6th Cir. 1990). Seventh Circuit: Taylor v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 920
F.2d 1372, 1377 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Wright, 901 F.2d 68, 70 (7th Cir. 1990).
Eighth Circuit: Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 922 F.2d 1357, 1364 (8th Cir. 1990); Gul-
branson v. Duluth, Missabe & Iron Range Ry., 921 F.2d 139, 143 (8th Cir. 1990); Fox v.
Dannenberg, 906 F.2d 1253, 1260-61 (8th Cir. 1990); Hawkins v. Hennepin Technical Ctr.,
900 F.2d 153, 156-57 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 150 (1990); United States v. Fawbush,
900 F.2d 150, 152 (8th Cir. 1990). Ninth Circuit: Dean v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 924
F.2d 805, 811-12 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Gomez-Gallardo, 915 F.2d 553, 557 (9th
Cir. 1990); Hudspeth v. Commissioner, 914 F.2d 1207, 1215 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Simtob, 901 F.2d 799, 804 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Tafollo-Cardenas, 897 F.2d 976,
981 (9th Cir. 1990). Tenth Circuit: United States v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 1403, 1416 (10th Cir.
1990); Dugan v. EMS Helicopters, Inc., 915 F.2d 1428, 1435 (10th Cir. 1990); Graham ex rel
Graham v. Wyeth Labs., 906 F.2d 1399, 1419 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 511 (1990).
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small as it is, is somewhat misleading. Examination of the cases indicates
(1) that some of the alleged errors are not really evidentiary errors, and
(2) that in a number of cases an element other than evidentiary error may
have accounted for the appellate court's response despite the court's
stated reliance on an erroneous evidentiary ruling. These thirty cases
suggest that an evidentiary error alone is not very likely to induce the
reviewing court to term the error "reversible" on the ground that the
error affected a substantial right of a party.5
II. STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF 1990 CASES SPECIFICALLY
REVERSED FOR EVIDENTIARY ERROR
Before turning to a more detailed analysis of the factors that are
present in the thirty cases in addition to evidentiary error, a few general
statistics are in order. Of the thirty reversals on the basis of evidentiary
error, seventeen occurred in civil cases6 and thirteen in criminal cases.
7
Eleventh Circuit: United States v. Eason, 920 F.2d 731, 737-38 (11th Cir. 1990); Montgomery
v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 898 F.2d 1537, 1541 (11th Cir. 1990); FDIC v. Marina, 892
F.2d 1522, 1528 (lth Cir. 1990).
5. When an appellant raises an evidentiary error, Federal Rule of Evidence 103 requires
the reviewing court to consider (1) whether an erroneous ruling in admitting or excluding
evidence was made below, (2) whether this error was appropriately brought to the trial court's
attention, either by objection or offer of proof, and (3) whether a substantial right of a party
was affected. FED. R. EvID. 103. If the court finds that no evidentiary error occurred below,
it will not reverse on an evidentiary ground. If the court finds that no substantial right of a
par!y was affected even though error occurred, it will likewise not reverse and will term the
error "harmless." See, eg., Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65. If error oc-
curred below and affected a substantial right, the court must decide further whether the error
was appropriately raised below. If it was, the court may reverse, finding "prejudicial" or "re-
versible" error. See, eg., WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 2, 103[06]-[07]. If the error
was not brought to the trial court's attention, the court may still reverse, but only if it also
determines that "plain error" occurred excusing the failure to make a proper record. See id. %
103[07]. "Substantial rights" are nowhere defined in the Federal Rules of Evidence, or other
governing authority. See 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1988) ("On the hearing of any appeal or writ of
certiorari in any case, the court shall give judgment after an examination of the record without
regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties."); see also
FED. R. Civ. P. 61 ("[Court] must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does
not affect the substantial rights of the parties."); FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a) ("Any error, defect,
irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.").
6. Dean, 924 F.2d 805; Williams, 922 F.2d 1357; Gulbranson, 921 F.2d 139; Taylor, 920
F.2d 1372; Dugan, 915 F.2d 1428; Hudspeth, 914 F.2d 1207; Dartez, 910 F.2d 1291; Edmonds,
910 F.2d 1284; Davidson Oil Country Supply Co., 908 F.2d 1238; Graham, 906 F.2d 1399; Fox,
906 F.2d 1253; Laney, 901 F.2d 1319; Hawkins, 900 F.2d 153; Montgomery, 898 F.2d 1537;
Ealy, 897 F.2d 1159; Habecker, 893 F.2d 49; Marina, 892 F.2d 1522.
7. Eason, 920 F.2d 731; Sullivan, 919 F.2d 1403; Long, 917 F.2d 691; Bolick, 917 F.2d
135; Gomez-Gallardo, 915 F.2d 553; Simpson, 910 F.2d 154; Colombo, 909 F.2d 711; Biaggi,
909 F.2d 662; Miller, 904 F.2d 65; Simtob, 901 F.2d 799; Wright, 901 F.2d 68; Fawbush, 900
F.2d 150; Tafollo-Cardenas, 897 F.2d 976.
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This ratio of criminal cases to civil cases, which is remarkably consistent
with the ratio between criminal and civil trials,' dispels the notion, at
least for 1990, that a considerably higher percentage of reversals will oc-
cur in criminal cases because a court will be more likely to find that a
party's substantial rights have been affected. 9
Taking at face value the appellate court's stated reason for reversing,
the errors are almost evenly divided between errors in admitting evidence
(sixteen) 10 and errors in excluding evidence (fourteen).1 The courts
were, however, much more likely to find reversible error in a criminal
case because of the erroneous admission of evidence, and in a civil case
because of the erroneous exclusion of evidence. In nine of the twelve
criminal cases, error consisted of admitting evidence erroneously, 12 and
in eleven of the seventeen civil cases error was attributed to the erroneous
exclusion of evidence.
13
The thirty opinions can also be classified with regard to the nature
of the mistake the trial judge made in applying an evidentiary rule. The
Federal Rules of Evidence in general have moved away from mechanical,
per se solutions in favor of directives to judges to exercise their discretion
8. 43.3% of the reversals occurred in criminal cases. In the twelve month period between
July 1, 1989 and June 30, 1990, criminal cases accounted for 43.7% of all trials. 1990 ANN.
REP., supra note 3, at 161 (8931 of 20,433 trials were criminal cases).
9. Certainly, the Kotteakos opinion suggested that findings of reversible error might be
expected more frequently in criminal cases. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 762-63
(1946). In discussing how the reviewing court should interpret the harmless error statute, the
Court wrote:
Necessarily the character of the proceeding, what is at stake upon its outcome, and
the relation of the error asserted to casting the balance for decision on the case as a
whole, are material factors in judgment. The statute in terms makes no distinction
between civil and criminal cases. But this does not mean that the same criteria shall
always be applied regardless of this difference.
Id.
10. Gulbranson, 921 F.2d 139; Taylor, 920 F.2d 1372; Eason, 920 F.2d 731; Long, 917
F.2d 691; Bolick, 917 F.2d 135; Dugan, 915 F.2d 1428; Gomez-Gallardo, 915 F.2d 553; Dartez,
910 F.2d 1291; Edmonds, 910 F.2d 1284; Simpson, 910 F.2d 154; Colombo, 909 F.2d 711;
Wright, 901 F.2d 68; Fawbush, 900 F.2d 150; Montgomery, 898 F.2d 1537; Ealy, 897 F.2d
1159; Tafollo-Cardenas, 897 F.2d 976.
11. Dean, 924 F.2d 805; Williams, 922 F.2d 1357; Sullivan, 919 F.2d 1403; Hudspeth, 914
F.2d 1207; Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662; Davidson Oil Country Supply Co., 908 F.2d 1238; Graham,
906 F.2d 1399; Fox, 906 F.2d 1253; Miller, 904 F.2d 65; Laney, 901 F.2d 1319; Simtob, 901
F.2d 799; Hawkins, 900 F.2d 153; Habecker, 893 F.2d 49; Marina, 892 F.2d 1522.
12. Eason, 920 F.2d at 737-38; Long, 917 F.2d at 704-05; Bolick, 917 F.2d at 140; Gomez-
Gallardo, 915 F.2d at 557; Simpson, 910 F.2d at 158; Colombo, 909 F.2d at 715; Wright, 901
F.2d at 70; Fawbush, 900 F.2d at 152; Tafollo-Cardenas, 897 F.2d at 981.
13. Dean, 924 F.2d at 811-12; Williams, 922 F.2d at 1364; Hudspeth, 914 F.2d at 1215;
Davidson Oil Country Supply Co., 908 F.2d at 1249; Graham, 906 F.2d at 1419; Fox, 906 F.2d
at 1260-61; Laney, 901 F.2d at 1321; Hawkins, 900 F.2d at 156-57; Habecker, 893 F.2d at 53;
Marina, 892 F.2d at 1528.
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in making the particular determinations specified by the rule in ques-
tion. 4 Most of the Federal Rules set forth general principles or "stan-
dards" rather than inflexible "rules" of law.' 5 Nevertheless, some of the
Federal Rules, such as the great majority of the class hearsay exceptions,
still employ a per se "rules" approach; hearsay offered pursuant to one of
these exceptions is admissible only if certain specified conditions are sat-
isfied.' 6 Other Federal Rules operate as "standards." They require the
court to exercise its judgment in order to determine whether the rule will
apply. The residual hearsay exception, for instance, directs the court to
find whether "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness"
exist.' 7 Some of the Federal Rules utilize a mixed approach of rule and
standard. Rule 608(b), for example, contains per se limitations, such as
the exclusion of extrinsic evidence and the requirement that the evidence
be relevant to "truthfulness," intertwined with a directive to the court to
exercise discretion. 18
Appellate courts often speak of reviewing the trial court's discretion
regardless of whether they are dealing with a rule or a standard or a
mixture of the two. If we disregard the courts' terminology and look
instead at the nature of the particular provision the court is construing,
we see that in twelve of the 1990 reversals the trial court had erred in
applying a per se provision,' 9 and in twelve other cases it had inappropri-
14. See David P. Leonard, Power and Responsibility in Evidence Law, 63 S. CAL. L. REv.
937 (1990) (suggesting it is more likely that truth will be found if judges use their own wisdom
and sensitivity); Thomas M. Mengler, The Theory of Discretion in the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, 74 IowA L. REv. 413 (1989) (suggesting that trial court should have discretion to
admit all relevant evidence).
15. For a discussion of the distinction between "rules" and "standards," see Duncan Ken-
nedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. Rnv. 1685, 1688 (1976).
The author states:
The first dimension of rules is that of formal realizability .... The extreme of formal
realizability is a directive to an official that requires him to respond to the presence
together of each of a list of easily distinguishable factual aspects of a situation by
intervening in a determinate way ....
... The application of a standard requires the judge both to discover the facts of
a particular situation and to assess them in terms of the purposes or social values
embodied in the standard.
Id. at 1687-88; see also H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 121-32 (1961) (distinguishing
between "plain" cases that clearly fit within general rule and problematic cases which require
interpretation of rule).
16. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803(l)-(5).
17. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 803(24); FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(5).
18. David P. Leonard, Appellate Review of Evidentiary Rulings, 70 N.C. L. REv. (forth-
coming 1992) (manuscript at 13-18, on file with author) (reviewing opinions construing Rule
608).
19. Included in this footnote are cases in which the cqurt made an evidentiary determina-
tion that does not rest directly on a Federal Rule of Evidence. Dean v. Trans World Airlines,
April 1992]
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ately exercised its discretion.20 In one case the court found numerous
Inc., 924 F.2d 805, 811 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding error not to have admitted misdemeanor
conviction for failure to file complete tax return because it involves dishonesty within meaning
of Rule 609(a)(2)); Gulbranson v. Duluth, Missabe & Iron Range Ry., 921 F.2d 139, 142 (8th
Cir. 1990) (holding error in violation of Rule 801(d)(2)(D) to have admitted minutes of safety
committee where proffering party had failed to establish that statements related to matter
within scope of agent's employment); Taylor v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 920 F.2d 1372,
1375 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding error to permit impeachment of witness by contradiction as to
collateral or irrelevant matter elicited on cross-examination); United States v. Eason, 920 F.2d
731, 735 (1lth Cir. 1990) (holding error to have allowed conviction of someone other than
witness himself to be admitted to impeach witness); United States v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 1403,
1416 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding error due to prosecution's repeated use of evidence that had
never been shown to satisfy Rule 404(b)); United States v. Bolick, 917 F.2d 135, 140 (4th Cir.
1990) (holding error to admit prior consistent statements before any of declarants had taken
stand); Dugan v. EMS Helicopters, Inc., 915 F.2d 1428, 1432 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding error
not to have admitted plaintiff's complaint in other proceeding as admission pursuant to Rule
801(d)(2), and for impeachment, as it contained allegations inconsistent with plaintiff's posi-
tion in present case); United States v. Gomez-Gallardo, 915 F.2d 553, 556-57 (9th Cir. 1990)
(holding error to have permitted testimony by witness called for sole purpose of impeaching
him with otherwise inadmissible evidence); Dartez v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 910 F.2d 1291, 1294
(5th Cir. 1990) (holding error to have admitted excerpts from post-trial briefs in different case
as admissions of party opponent pursuant to Rule 801(d)(2) even though circuit had previously
held that briefs cannot be so characterized); United States v. Miller, 904 F.2d 65, 68 (D.C. Cir.
1990) (holding testimony before grand jury by witness who claimed Fifth Amendment privi-
lege at trial satisfied former testimony exception in Rule 804(b)(1) and should have been ad-
mitted against government); United States v. Tafollo-Cardenas, 897 F.2d 976, 979-80 (9th Cir.
1990) (holding witness's prior inconsistent statements to DEA agents should have been ex-
cluded as satisfying neither Rule 801(d)(1)(A) nor Rule 804(b)(3)); FDIC v. Marina, 892 F.2d
1522, 1526-27 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding error to exclude as hearsay statement which was not
being offered for its truth but to show parties' beliefs).
20. Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 922 F.2d 1357, 1361 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding error
to have precluded plaintiff from asking treating physician whether in his expert opinion plain-
tiff had experienced trauma in lower back); Hudspeth v. Commissioner, 914 F.2d 1207, 1214
(9th Cir. 1990) (holding tax court should have admitted evidence relating to valuation of tim-
ber made in settlement of another case as relevant to Commissioner's bias and therefore admis-
sible under bias exception to Rule 408); Edmonds v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 910 F.2d 1284,
1287 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding error to permit psychologist to testify that stress worsened plain-
tiff's coronary artery disease); United States v. Simpson, 910 F.2d 154, 158 (4th Cir. 1990)
(weapons charge; holding error to have admitted evidence that defendant met drug courier
profile); United States v. Colombo, 909 F.2d 711, 713 (2d Cir. 1990) (conspiracy to commit
robberies; holding error to have admitted evidence that one of robbery victims had been raped
and sodomized); United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662, 691 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding error to
have excluded evidence that defendant had rejected government's offer of immunity as proof of
"consciousness of innocence"), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1102 (1991); Fox v. Dannenberg, 906
F.2d 1253, 1257 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding error to have excluded opinion of two engineers with
considerable training and experience with regard to accident reconstruction as to who was
driving car); United States v. Simtob, 901 F.2d 799, 804 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding error for
court to have refused to listen to tape recording after close of evidence; tape was relevant to
perjury by main prosecution witness and could have been used for impeachment and cross-
examination); United States v. Wright, 901 F.2d 68, 70 (7th Cir. 1990) (narcotics prosecution;
holding error to admit wiretapped conversation made six months after charged sales in which
defendant boasted of being drug dealer); Hawkins v. Hennepin Technical Ctr., 900 F.2d 153,
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errors of both types.21
In the remaining five cases, although the courts attributed the rever-
sals to mistaken evidentiary rulings, a closer look reveals that the faulty
conclusions below depended more on the trial court's misapprehension
about the applicable substantive law than on errors relating to eviden-
tiary principles.
III. FACTORS IN EVIDENTIARY ERROR REVERSALS
A. Substantive Law Errors
Rule 401 states that "'[r]elevant evidence' means evidence having
any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to
the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence."2 2 This definition requires the trial court
to undertake two different explorations. First, it must discover which
propositions of fact are of consequence or material. The conclusions
reached will be dictated not by the rules of evidence but by the applicable
substantive law. Second, the trial court must engage in an analysis to
ascertain whether the proffered item of evidence alters the probability of
the identified consequential or material facts. This examination, in
which the court considers and evaluates evidentiary hypotheses in order
to determine whether the proffered evidence could affect the trier's evalu-
ation of the probability of a consequential fact, is central to the law of
evidence.
When an appellate court reverses because a trial judge has excluded
an entire line of proof due to a misconception of the governing law, there
is no need to assess the validity of the trial judge's evidentiary hypothesis.
The trial court's error does not consist of failing to understand how a
proffered item of evidence makes a matter properly provable in the case
156 (8th Cir.) (action claiming gender discrimination and unlawful retaliatory discharge after
complaint of sexual harassment; holding error to have excluded details about alleged harass-
ment even though harassment was not charged because atmosphere of condoned sexual harass-
ment in workplace increased likelihood of retaliation after complaint), cert denied, 111 S. Ct.
150 (1990); United States v. Fawbush, 900 F.2d 150, 152 (8th Cir. 1990) (prosecution for
aggravated sexual assault; holding error to have admitted testimony by defendant's daughters
that he had sexually abused them as children and had impregnated one of them nine years
prior to trial); Habecker v. Copperloy Corp., 893 F.2d 49, 52-53 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding error
to have excluded plaintiff's expert on causation because he lacked engineering degree in light
of expert's extensive background in health and safety sciences).
21. United States v. Long, 917 F.2d 691, 697-701 (2d Cir. 1990) (prosecution for RICO
violation; holding possible error to have admitted tape recordings of co-conspirators' conversa-
tions under 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(1)'s sealing requirements and holding error to have admitted
expert testimony on organized crime).
22. FED. R. EVID. 401.
April 1992]
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more or less probable. Instead, the coUrt has made a mistake about the
applicable substantive law. Although a court has discretion to exclude
evidence pursuant to Rule 40323 when the probative value of the prof-
fered evidence is substantially outweighed by the factors specified in the
rule, the trial court will seriously misestimate probative value if it fails to
understand the issue to which the proof is directed. Consequently, its
wide discretion under Rule 403, or other rules, is unlikely to cure an
error of exclusion based on a misperception of the material issues in con-
troversy.24 Although the appellate court may state that the court abused
'its discretion under Rule 403 in excluding the evidence, the source of the
error is the mistake about the governing substantive law.
In Laney v. Celotex Corp. ,2 for instance, an action seeking damages
for injuries sustained from alleged asbestos exposure, the trial court re-
fused to allow the defendant to introduce evidence that plaintiff had been
exposed to asbestos manufactured by others than the lone defendant.
The trial court concluded that the evidence would be confusing and mis-
leading under Rule 403 because "Defendant could not disprove Plain-
tiff's case by showing that there were other causes unless Defendant had
testimony that they were the sole cause."' 2' The appellate court found
that the trial judge had misconstrued the governing state law which held
defendant liable only if his negligence was a substantial factor in produc-
ing the injury, an analysis that "cannot be made in a vacuum. '27 The
exclusion of evidence relating to the fiber content of the other products to
which plaintiff had been exposed prevented the jury from being able to
ascertain which, if any, were the substantial factors. Thus, although the
appellate court stated that it was reversing for an abuse of discretion in
applying Rule 403, the reversal was, in fact, really attributable to the trial
court's misunderstanding of state substantive law.28 In addition to La-
ney, four other reversals appear to hinge in large measure on misconcep-
23. Rule 403 provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if. its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presenta-
tion of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EVID. 403.
24. See Montgomery v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 898 F.2d 1537, 1541 (11th Cir. 1990)
(discretion to admit expert testimony does not mean that court did not err when it allowed
expert to testify about issue that court rather than jury was required to decide).
25. 901 F.2d 1319, 1320 (6th Cir. 1990).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1321.
28. The court also expressed doubt, but did not decide, whether the trial court had erred
with regard to an evidentiary analysis of relevancy when it allowed certain letters to be intro-
duced as relevant to defendant's knowledge. Id. at 1321 & n.1.
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tions about the governing law.2 9
The opinions in the remaining twenty-five cases in which the rever-
sal was attributed to evidentiary error reveal a number of recurring pat-
terns which perhaps explain why these few appeals succeeded when the
appellate courts affirmed more than two hundred other cases in which
appellant objected to an evidentiary ruling below.30
B. Prosecutorial Abuse
In nine of the cases, or almost one-third of all reversals and close to
seventy percent of the thirteen reversals in the criminal cases, the appel-
late court devoted a portion of its opinion to details and complaints
about prosecutorial behavior which it explicitly deplored.31 The conduct
29. For example, in Davidson Oil Country Supply Co. v. Klockner, Inc., 908 F.2d 1238
(5th Cir. 1990), the plaintiff sued for a breach of warranty. The trial court refused to allow any
evidence of other failures with regard to the particular well tubing offered by the plaintiff to
show a latent defect in the tubing. Id. at 1243. The defendant argued that case law declaring
such evidence relevant to the question of merchantability was inapplicable in its case because it
was the seller rather than the manufacturer of the product. Id. at 1245. Quoting from the
Texas Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), the court concluded that this distinction was irrele-
vant since the defendant had made the warranty as the seller. Id. at 1245 n.18.
Similarly, in Graham v. Wyeth Labs., 906 F.2d 1399 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 111 S. Ct.
511 (1990), an action against the manufacturer of the diptheria/tetanus/pertussis (DTP) vac-
cine, the trial court excluded the plaintiff's experts on the ground that they possessed no exper-
tise with regard to whether the vaccine could cause the type of damage suffered by the child.
Id. at 1408. The defendant was proffering experts to testify regarding an intervening cause,
that is, that a pre-vaccination stroke had caused the child's injuries. Id. at 1409. The court
held that the trial judge could not employ its discretion with regard to expert testimony "to
restrict viable and relevant theories offered by a party." Id
In Montgomery v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 898 F.2d 1537 (11th Cir. 1990), the court
held that under Florida law, the judge, rather than the jury, should have decided whether the
insurer's duty to defend encompassed suit against the Internal Revenue Service. Id. at 1540-
41 & nn.8-9. Consequently, it was error to permit the plaintiff's expert to give an opinion as
to whether the insurer had an obligation to hire tax counsel. Id. at 1541. The court ordered
judgment non obstante veredicto in favor of the insurer after construing the contract. Id.
Finally, in Ealy v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 897 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied., 111
S. Ct. 370 (1990), the court held that it was error to have admitted expert testimony as to
whether Bendectin caused the child's birth defects. Id. at 1164. In a previous case, Richard-
son v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert denied, 493 U.S. 882
(1989), the court had held that as a matter of law, based on present epidemiological findings,
Bendectin was not a human teratogen. Id. at 827.
30. A Westlaw search that sought all cases in which the appellate court affirmed and the
opinion contained a headnote discussing a federal rule of evidence as well as the terms "harm-
less error" or "abuse of discretion" produced 244 entries.
31. United States v. Eason, 920 F.2d 731, 735-36, 737 n.9, 738 n.ll (11th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 1403, 1412-16 '424-28 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Bolick, 917 F.2d 135, 140-42 (4th Cir. 1990); Unitzi States v. Gomez-Gallardo, 915 F.2d 553,
556 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Simpson, 910 F.2d 154, 156-58 (4th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Colombo, 909 F.2d 711, 714-15 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Miller, 904 F.2d 65,
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complained of included mischaracterizations or disregard of the applica-
ble law in oral argument or briefs, 2 the deliberate flouting of the trial
judge's evidentiary rulings, 33 inappropriate argument to the jury that
compounded the evidentiary error 34 and manipulation of the evidentiary
rules to produce the illusion that there was considerably more evidence
against the defendant than actually existed.35 In some of the cases, more
67-68 (D.C. Cir. 1990); United States v. Simtob, 901 F.2d 799, 802, 804-06 (9th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Wright, 901 F.2d 68, 70 (7th Cir. 1990).
32. Eason, 920 F.2d at 735 (government deliberately introduced offending evidence citing
case law inappropriately); Miller, 904 F.2d at 67 (prosecutor's brief mischaracterized his state-
ments at trial); Wright, 901 F.2d at 70 (at oral argument, in disregard of Rule 404 and Seventh
Circuit case directly on point, government attorney argued that government "believes that
evidence of other crimes should be admissible if relevant, and it is relevant if the other crime is
of the same general character (e.g., trafficking in cocaine) as the crime with which the defend-
ant is charged"). For a discussion of the court's comment in Miller, see infra note 36 and
accompanying text; for a discussion of Eason, see infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
33. In the Colombo case, for example, after a mistrial, the prosecutor acknowledged that
introduction of evidence at retrial that the robbery victim was raped and sodomized might
warrant reversal and that consequently he would not go into any details at the second trial.
909 F.2d at 714-15. He indicated that he would ask only if the victim had been "sexually
assaulted." Id. at 714. Nevertheless, at the second trial, the prosecutor "repeatedly harped"
"on the rape and sodomy of a robbery victim-despite his acknowledgment of the risk and
assurance that he would not introduce such proof." Id. at 714-15; see also Sullivan, 919 F.2d
at 1412-17 (prosecution elicited evidence of uncharged crimes despite prior warnings by judge
about use of Rule 404(b) evidence and despite sustained objections to testimony).
34. In Sullivan the prosecutor insinuated in closing that the trial judge had found the
evidence sufficient or else the charges would have been dismissed. 919 F.2d at 1425-26. Fur-
thermore, the prosecutor read from a purported transcript of an inaudible tape, although the
transcript had never been found to be accurate or admitted into evidence. Id. at 1425. There
was also a Brady claim with regard to handwritten notes that the government had destroyed.
Id. at 1426. On remand, the trial court was directed to hold an evidentiary hearing with
regard to this claim. Id. at 1427-28; see also Simtob, 901 F.2d at 805-06 (prosecutorial vouch-
ing for chief prosecution witness; evidentiary error consisted of court's refusal to reopen trial
to review tape relevant to witness's credibility).
35. In Bolick the government's first witness testified that each of the government's three
witnesses to the drug transaction had told him the defendant was guilty. 917 F.2d at 137.
Although the statements ultimately might have been admissible as prior consistent statements
after the witnesses had testified and been impeached, the court found reversible error in the
prosecutor's trial tactic which doubled the number of times the jury heard that the defendant
did it, especially since the statements came from the mouth of a law enforcement official. Id.
at 140-43.
In Gomez-Gallardo the government called its witness, knowing in advance what he would
say, solely for the purpose of impeaching him and then asked the jury to consider him a liar.
915 F.2d at 556. The court stated: "[Tihe government's actions directly undermined the judi-
cial process .... The adversarial system breaks down when the defendant is prevented from
defining and presenting his own case and the prosecution proves guilt by creating and then
destroying its own creation." Id.
In Simpson the government "grossly exaggerated" the probative value of a drug courier
profile where there was no evidence linking the defendant-charged with unlawful possession
of a firearm and attempting to board a plane with a concealed weapon-to the drug trade. 910
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than one type of prosecutorial misconduct occurred. The appellate char-
acterizations of the United States Attorney's conduct ranged from some
fairly mild sarcasm36 to considerable outrage. In United States v. Ea-
son,"7 for example, the court was so offended at the prosecutor's deliber-
ate introduction of the witness's father's prior conviction and its
rationalization of the error3" that it felt "obliged again to remind the
United States Attorney's office in this district as well as other federal
prosecutors of the duties of a United States Attorney in a criminal prose-
cution."3 9 In all of these cases the court was clearly annoyed with the
prosecution. How great a role this displeasure played in leading to a
reversal of course cannot be ascertained. Yet the reviewing court's will-
ingness to make disapproving comments about the prosecutor's behavior
is perhaps some indication that these cases have been singled out for re-
versal not merely because of the evidentiary mistake but in hopes of re-
forming the prosecution's attitude.
C. Behavior of Counsel in Civil Cases
Although counsel's obligation in a civil case differs from that of a
government attorney, irritation at counsel's behavior may perhaps play a
role in civil cases as well. In a number of the opinions, the appellate
court noted ways in which appellee's counsel misrepresented the way in
F.2d at 157. The government suggested that the defendant was an armed drug courier on the
way to the source city. Id. at 158.
Finally, in Wright the police waited six months after allegedly observing sales of a few
bags of crack with which the defendant was charged before putting a telephone tap on his
phone. 901 F.2d at 70. At trial the prosecution played a recorded conversation in which the
defendant boasted of being a wholesale dealer. Id. at 69. The tape's only relevance was to
prove that the defendant may have been guilty of some similar crimes. Id. at 70.
36. Miller, 904 F.2d at 67. The court stated: "The government, somewhat disingenuously
in its brief to this court, claims the prosecutor 'conceded' before the district judge that
Matarazzo had not waived his privilege. (Since the government was attempting to prevent
Matarazzo's testimony at trial, that is an interesting use of the word 'conceded.')" Id. The
opinion further notes the prosecutor's "contemptuous" objection, calling "absurd" defense
counsel's request for the admission of grand jury testimony of an unavailable witness pursuant
to Rule 804(b)(1). Id. at 67-68. The court found that the prosecutor's response and the trial
court's prompt denial of the request excused defense counsel's failure to refer specifically to
Rule 804(b)(1). Id. at 67.
37. 920 F.2d 731 (11th Cir. 1990).
38. The court was also clearly annoyed with the United States Attorney's legal argument
in support of its position. It termed the government's reliance on a particular case as "disin-
genuous," id. at 735 n.4, and then added, "[i]neredibly, the government also cites ....... id.
at 735 n.6.
39. Id. at 735. The court then quoted from a prior circuit opinion about the prosecutor's
"heavy obligation to the accused." Id. at 736 (quoting Dunn v. United States, 307 F.2d 883,
885 (5th Cir. 1962)).
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which evidence had been used.4° Acknowledgement of the error, fol-
lowed by a harmless error argument, might perhaps have proved more
effective.
D. Behavior of the Trial Court
Appellate courts clearly are far more reticent in discussing the con-
duct of the trial court than the actions of the prosecutor, but every now
and then a revealing comment emerges. In some instances, one can read
between the lines a suggestion that the judge was not sufficiently even-
handed. Reviewing courts seem particularly concerned about impartial-
ity with regard to expert testimony.
In Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores,a" for example, the court found plain
error in the trial judge's refusal to permit plaintiff's experts to state their
opinions on medical causation. The details in the majority's opinion42
about how these rulings were made suggest the reversing judges' concern
that the district judge was not sufficiently dispassionate and conveyed his
assessment of the case to the jury.43
40. See Gulbranson v. Duluth, Missabe & Iron Range Ry., 921 F.2d 139, 142-43 (8th Cir.
1990) (plaintiff argued on appeal that statements had been offered for non-hearsay purpose of
showing knowledge on part of defendant rather than for truth of matter asserted, but on clos-
ing argument plaintiff's attorney not only used statements for truth but suggested that they
warranted "more credibility than the live testimony of the witnesses"); Dartez v. Owens-Illi-
nois, Inc., 910 F.2d 1291, 1292-93 (5th Cir. 1990) (noting that plaintiffs were "fu]ndaunted by
Hardy" (the controlling case) and then argued in their brief that "highly unusual circum-
stances" that Hardy indicated might justify exception applied but did not specify any unusual
circumstances); see also Taylor v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 920 F.2d 1372, 1377 (7th
Cir. 1990) (noting that appellee in its brief mischaracterized evidence as impeachment evidence
in violation of principles in prior opinion of court; evidence of prior back injury inadmissible
both substantively and for impeachment used to suggest that plaintiff had preexisting injury
and "this tenuous evidence was used to bootstrap argument that [plaintiff] lied on his employ-
ment application").
41. 922 F.2d 1357 (8th Cir. 1990).
42. The dissenting judge agreed that the trial judge had erroneously excluded evidence on
medical causation but was unwilling to find plain error "on a barren record" or to overlook
plaintiff's lawyer's failure to make an offer of proof as to what the experts would have testified.
Id. at 1365 (Fagg, J., dissenting). The dissenting judge found no miscarriage of justice in the
district court's rulings. Id at 1364-65 (Fagg, J., dissenting).
43. The opinion states:
The district court's repeated refusal to allow appellant to ask his expert wit-
nesses their opinion regarding the cause of appellant's injuries and then its refusal to
allow appellant to rephrase the question ... denied appellant a fair opportunity to
litigate his case. Moreover, while the district court denied appellant the opportunity
to elicit from his own medical experts their opinion on the cause of his injuries, it did
allow Wal-Mart on cross-examination to question the doctors about the likely cause
of appellant's injuries.
The district court responded harshly to appellant's questioning of his expert wit-
nesses. Indeed, the record indicates that the district court warned appellant's counsel
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In other cases as well, the appellate court seems to be suggesting
that one party was somehow favored to the detriment of the other.'
Particular concern is expressed when the trial judge excludes evidence on
a particular issue but admits a similar type of evidence offered by the
opponent on the same issue.
45
There are also cases in which the evidentiary error seems to confirm
that matters were not proceeding appropriately at trial, and that the trial
judge did not have matters sufficiently well in hand. In United States v.
Long,46 for instance, the trial judge made a number of evidentiary errors.
The judge allowed questions of character witnesses that required them to
that he would be held in contempt if he brought up again the issue of whether a
medical expert can give his or her opinion on the cause of the injuries treated ....
Appellant may not have been a credible plaintiff. However, that was for the
jury, not the district court, to decide.
Id. at 1362. The opinion also quotes twice, in text and footnote, what the trial judge told the
jury when he erroneously ruled that the plaintiff's expert would not be allowed to explain the
basis of his opinion and the substance of it:
This man is not entitled, in my opinion, to pass on what he was told as the basis for
it. He's supposed to tell you what he found and so on. We're not-he's not-we're
not testing the credibility of the plaintiff with respect to that. A lot of things that the
people [sic] tell doctors isn't true. You know that and he'll tell you that too.
Id. at 1363 & n.5.
44. See, eg., Habecker v. Copperloy Corp., 893 F.2d 49 (3d Cir. 1990). In Habecker, in
finding that the lower court erred in excluding one of the plaintiffs' experts, the court acknowl-
edged that the testimony may have been cumulative but noted that the "defendants collectively
offered the testimony of three witnesses on the issue." Id. at 53. Furthermore, the court
responded to the plaintiffs' complaints that the district court had continually admitted evi-
dence about industry standards, government regulations, and other "state of the art" matters
by stating that "[t]he district court has recognized the problem, and we are confident that it
will carefully limit the admissibility of such evidence on retrial." Id.; see also Fox v. Dannen-
berg, 906 F.2d 1253, 1257-58 (8th Cir. 1990). Fox involved a wrongful death action in which
the issue of who was driving the car was crucial. The appellate court held that the trial court
erred in excluding the plaintiff's expert on the identity of the driver while allowing the defense
expert to testify that it was impossible to determine who was driving based on the facts and
circumstances of the accident. Id at 1257. The court explained: "We consider the district
court's admission of [defendant's] expert's testimony that it is impossible to conclude who was
driving the car to be error only in light of the district court's contemporaneous ruling exclud-
ing [plaintiff's] experts' testimony as to who was driving." Id. at 1258. The court found
additional reversible error in the instruction the trial judge gave the jury, authorizing them to
infer that the same driver who had been driving at the beginning of the trip some four hours
previously was still driving at the time of the accident, and in the judge's refusal to instruct as
to res ipsa loquitur. Id. at 1258-60.
45. United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662, 690-93 (2d Cir. 1990) (excluding evidence bear-
ing on defendant's consciousness of innocence but permitting evidence of consciousness of guilt
consisting primarily of wife's action in buying gold with $3.5 million she took out of joint
account shortly after cooperating witnesses pleaded guilty; noting that admission of this evi-
dence "exacerbated" unfairness of exclusion of defendant's evidence), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct
1102 (1991). See supra note 44 for a discussion of Fox, 906 F.2d 1253, a case with similar
evidentiary exclusions.
46. 917 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1990).
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assume the guilt of the defendants.4 7 Furthermore, the trial judge per-
mitted an FBI special agent to testify at length as an expert about organ-
ized crime even though the nexus with organized crime was extremely
tangential, a" and gave an erroneous instruction to the jury suggesting
that defendant's wife was willing to testify against him when in fact she
was seeking to avoid criminal charges against herself.4 9 The appellate
court acknowledged that "[w]hether any of these errors would, absent
the others, have been harmless is irrelevant in light of the cumulative
prejudice caused."50 In addition to these evidentiary errors, however, the
court also erred in the jury instruction it gave regarding RICO,51 and
failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing with regard to the chain of cus-
tody and integrity of electronic surveillance tapes.52 Multiple errors in
addition to mistaken evidentiary rulings occurred in other cases as well. 3
E. Undiscussed Factors
In all of the cases discussed above evidentiary rules clearly matter in
the sense that they provide the court with a handle for reversing. How-
ever, whether the evidentiary rulings would have caused a reversal had
counsel or the court acted differently cannot be ascertained. Further-
more, evidentiary rules may be a convenient scapegoat in cases in which
the reversing court never mentions anything other than an erroneous evi-
47. Id. at 703-04. The questioning was error in light of the Second Circuit's previous
decision in United States v. Oshatz, 912 F.2d 534 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 1595
(1991), in which the court found error though it was termed harmless when questioning as-
sumed the guilt of the defendants.
48. Long, 917 F.2d at 701-03.
49. Id. at 698-99.
50. Id. at 705.
51. Id. at 696-98 (RICO is acronym for Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organizations
Act).
52. The appellate court did not explicitly find error with regard to the tapes but it in-
structed the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing in the event of a retrial. Id. at 699-
700.
53. United States v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 1403 (10th Cir. 1990), is another case in which
evidentiary error is but one of the problems. In addition to the erroneous references to evi-
dence of other crimes, and prosecutorial misbehavior, see supra note 34 and accompanying
text, the trial judge failed to give a warranted instruction on entrapment. Sullivan, 919 F.2d at
1418. Similarly, in United States v. Simtob, 901 F.2d 799 (9th Cir. 1990), the court was con-
cerned about the trial judge's failure to review a tape offered to impeach the prime prosecution
witness, see supra note 34, even in response to post-trial motions for retrial. Furthermore,
although the court concluded that the government was not involved, the court was clearly
disturbed that the informant in the case had approached the prime prosecution witness before
he was due to testify and threatened that his sentence would be increased if he deviated from
his testimony. Simtob, 901 F.2d at 803. The informant had also destroyed some notes though
the court found that this did not deprive defendant of a fair trial. Id. at 809. There was
prosecutorial misbehavior in this case as well. Id. at 805-06.
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dentiary ruling below. Were one to look at the record, one might discern
questionable conduct by the court or counsel about which the appellate
court chooses to remain silent.54 When the court remains mute, it is, of
course, impossible to discern how frequently courtroom misconduct oc-
curs. Furthermore, silence coupled with the harmless error rule may
mean that cases are affirmed despite prosecutorial or judicial
misconduct.1
5
IV. CONCLUSION
An analysis of the thirty officially reported reversals on the ground
of evidentiary error in 1990 leaves the impression that evidentiary rules
frequently matter relatively little in the case before the federal appellate
court-that most reversals occur when counsel, particularly prosecutors,
or the court are acting unfairly. Of course, if the appellate court explains
an evidentiary rule, this may have some future effect regardless of
whether the court reverses or finds harmless error. Presumably conscien-
tious counsel and trial judges pay attention to appellate reasoning even
though an affirmance on harmless error grounds means that the interpre-
tation is merely dictum. The appellate court may be serving notice of a
future intention to enforce an evidentiary rule.56
But is this enough? Are the policies underlying the rules of evidence
54. A number of years ago I devided to write a note on an opinion I did not understand, in
which the Second Circuit had reversed a conviction for the erroneous receipt of other crimes
evidence. The reason I did not understand the opinion was that I knew that exactly the same
kind of evidence had been admitted in a series of related cases in both the southern and eastern
districts of New York. I accordingly decided to look at the record on appeal. When I asked
for it at the courthouse the clerk first told me that it had not yet been returned by the court,
but then found it on a cart awaiting shelving. When I opened the record I found torn pieces of
yellow pad marking some of the pages. The material on those pages related to the other crimes
evidence on which the court had reversed, and outbursts by the trial judge directed at defense
counsel. The conduct of the trial judge was not mentioned in the opinion. More recently, I
also encountered some discontinuities between the appellate court's argument and the record
below. The odd circumstance that the defendants were being tried in the southern district of
New York was never mentioned, although the retrial was held in another district. Also, no-
where discussed in the opinion was the enormous pressure put upon defense counsel in this
multi-defendant case in having to make all objections at trial in writing. I wonder to what
extent others have encountered this phenomenon in which evidentiary error is used as a vehicle
for reversal although other nondisclosed factors may perhaps more adequately explain the
result. I also wonder how this matter could be researched.
55. See Vilija Bilaisis, Note, Harmless Error: Abettor of Courtroom Misconduct, 74 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 457, 475 (1983) (concluding that "harmless error standards ... are
eroding the integrity of the criminal justice system by encouraging violations of longstanding
trial rules").
56. See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Long and Oshatz
decisions.
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adequately served at the appellate level by hortatory opinions and a few
reversals a year when something goes seriously wrong at trial? Some
recent evidence scholarship demonstrates the appellate courts' unwilling-
ness to find error of any kind even when the trial court has committed
error with regard to rules that set forth per se conditions.5 7 When an
appellate court glosses over errors in applying rules as to which there is
no discretion by endorsing the result as a ruling within the trial court's
discretion, the evidentiary mistake obviously does not contribute to a re-
versal, and does not elicit an opinion that will affect the application of the
rule. Is this unwillingness to concede error at all, coupled with the enor-
mous volume of harmless error opinions, sending the message that evi-
dence rules matter very little? Further research needs to be done to see
the extent to which evidentiary rules are being ignored at trial. One pos-
sible lesson of the Clarence Thomas hearings, to which evidentiary rules
did not apply at all, is that untempered admissibility is not the ideal for
which to strive. Built into many of the rules over the centuries, and codi-
fied in the Federal Rules, are notions of fairness. If the appellate courts
do not remain vigilant in enforcing and expounding some of these rules,
we will lose some of the protections that rules of evidence are designed to
provide.
57. See, e.g., Leonard, supra note 18 (discussing Rule 608 provisions); Eleanor Swift, Has
the Hearsay Rule Been Abolished De Facto by Judicial Decision?, 76 MINN. L. REV. (forthcom-
ing 1992) (discussing how courts have ruled on hearsay exceptions); see also Victor J. Gold, Do
the FederalRules of Evidence Matter?, 25 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 909 (1992) (discussing tendency
of appellate courts to overlook trial courts' failure to consider prejudicial effect of conviction
evidence despite clear rule).
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